Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence
研究司法错误（冤枉好人或放过坏人）对犯罪威慑的影响，通过理论分析和两个实验发现，冤枉好人比放过坏人更能削弱威慑效果，且这种不对称完全由犯罪预期效用差异解释。
The economic theory of crime deterrence predicts that the conviction of an innocent individual (type I error) is as detrimental to deterrence as the acquittal of a guilty individual (type II error). In this paper, we qualify this result theoretically, showing that in the presence of risk aversion, loss aversion, or type I error aversion, type I errors have a stronger effect on deterrence than type II errors. We test these predictions with two experimental studies in which participants choose whether to steal from other individuals, under alternative combinations of probabilities of judicial errors. The results indicate that both types of errors have a significant impact on deterrence. As predicted, type I errors have a stronger impact on deterrence than type II errors. This asymmetry is entirely explained by differences in the expected utility gains from crime, whereas nonexpected utility factors do not play a significant role.