Rationality and Analysts' Forecast Bias
提出二次损失效用函数模型，解释分析师为获取管理层信息而主动制造乐观偏差，实证支持该偏差是理性的，而非传统认为的非理性或不准确。
ABSTRACT This paper proposes and tests a quadratic‐loos utility function for modeling corporate earnings forecasting, where financial analysts trade off bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy. Optimal forecasts with minimum expected error are optimistically biased and exhibit predictable cross‐sectional variation related to analyst and company characteristics. Empirical evidence from individual analyst forecasts is consistent with the model's predictions. These results suggest that positive and predictable bias may be a rational property of optimal earnings forecasts. Prior studies using classical notions of unbiasedness may have prematurely dismissed analysts' forecasts as being irrational or inaccurate.