Beggar‐Thy‐Neighbor Advertising: Theory and Application to Generic Commodity Promotion Programs
分析生产者团体在通用广告中的以邻为壑行为，发现非合作广告支出远超合作最优水平，并用1998年美国牛肉和猪肉数据验证。
Abstract Profits from generic advertising by a producer group often come partly at the expense of producers of closely related commodities. The resulting tendency toward excessive advertising is exacerbated by check‐off funding. To analyze this beggar‐thy‐neighbor behavior we compare a scenario where different producer groups cooperate and choose their advertising expenditures jointly to maximize the sum of profits across the groups, and a scenario where they optimize independently. In an illustrative example using 1998 data for U.S. beef and pork, the noncooperatively chosen expenditure on beef and pork advertising is more than three times the cooperative optimum.