Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985 to 1994
量化了1985至1994年间美国监管机构利用资本要求控制银行风险转移的努力，发现资本约束未能阻止大银行将风险转嫁给安全网，低资本和低债务存款比银行更易规避约束，1991年立法有所改善但未完全控制风险转移激励。
Unless priced and administered appropriately, a governmental safety net enhances risk‐shifting opportunities for banks. This paper quantifies regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk‐shifting by U.S. banks during 1985 to 1994 and investigates how much risk‐based capital requirements and other deposit‐insurance reforms improved this control. We find that capital discipline did not prevent large banks from shifting risk onto the safety net. Banks with low capital and debt‐to‐deposits ratios overcame outside discipline better than other banks. Mandates introduced by 1991 legislation have improved but did not establish full regulatory control over bank risk‐shifting incentives.