The Political Economy of Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements
研究了自愿出口限制协议作为传统保护主义替代方案的兴起，分析了其对进口来源、出口商利益及全球贸易稳定的影响，适合关注国际贸易政策与政治经济学的读者。
SUMMARY Voluntary export restraint agreements ( VER s) have emerged as a popular alternative to traditional protectionist devices, whose use is severely limited by trade agreements. Aimed at ‘disruptive’ suppliers, VER s tend to shift the source of imports away from the most efficient producers. Yet such negotiated agreements are attractive to exporters because they are preferable to the alternative of unilateral import barriers, especially since they allow exporters to control the trade restriction and thereby raise the export price. In fact all effective participants gain from the VER agreement, while consumers and others hurt by it are excluded from the negotiating process. Among the inherent problems of VER s, however, is their tendency to divert exports towards third markets, spreading protectionism worldwide and destabilizing trade relations. Continuing protectionist pressure in such an environment encourages the development of more sophisticated and comprehensive methods of induced export restraint.