Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting
研究发现，当工会不再代表某公司工人时，其关联养老基金对董事的反对票显著减少，而其他机构投资者无此变化，表明工会股东可能追求工人利益而非仅股东价值最大化。
Labor union pension funds have become increasingly vocal in governance matters; however, their motives are subject to fierce debate. I examine the proxy votes of AFL-CIO union funds around an exogenous change in the union representation of workers across firms. AFL-CIO-affiliated shareholders become significantly less opposed to directors once the AFL-CIO labor organization no longer represents a firm's workers. Other institutional investors, including mutual funds and public pension funds, do not exhibit similar voting behavior. Union opposition is also associated with negative valuation effects. The data suggest that some investors pursue worker interests, rather than maximize shareholder value alone. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.