Strategic Considerations, the Pecking Order Hypothesis, and Market Reactions to Equity Financing
在跨期框架下证明，即使有现金可用，被低估企业的管理者也可能选择发行股票，因此市场不会将所有股权发行公告视为企业被高估的信号，并分析了信息不对称和投资机会对股利政策及公告日市场反应的影响。
Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that in a world of asymmetric information, managers of overvalued firms issue equity, while managers of undervalued firms use cash, if available. This paper shows that, in a multiperiod world, managers of undervalued firms may find it optimal to issue stock, even though cash is available. Consequently, the market does not interpret all announcements of equity issues as signals of firm overvaluation. The paper also generates predictions regarding the effect of information asymmetry and investment oppor? tunities on i) dividend policy, and ii) the cross-sectional distribution of market reactions when an equity issue is announced.