Strategic Responses: A Survey Experiment on Opposition to Pension Reforms*
通过德国调查实验，分离主观预期与偏好，发现受访者可能为影响政策而低估退休时的工作能力，且这种策略性偏差在前东德地区更强。
Abstract The responses given in opinion polls on future policy reforms reflect both subjective expectations and preferences. We disentangle these factors using data from a controlled survey experiment conducted in Germany. At the time of the experiment, an increased retirement age had been proposed as part of a pension reform. Thus, the survey respondents faced an incentive to give biased responses. By understating their expected work ability at the age of retirement, they could make the increase of the retirement age a less attractive policy option. We find evidence for such strategic response behavior, and this strategic bias appears to be stronger in former communist East Germany.