Social Value of Public Information
研究通过媒体和高知名度市场参与者传播公共信息对福利的影响，发现当代理人没有社会价值的私人信息时，增加公共信息总能提高福利；但当代理人拥有独立信息来源时，效果不确定。
What are the welfare effects of enhanced dissemination of public information through the media and disclosures by market participants with high public visibility? We examine the impact of public information in a setting where agents take actions appropriate to the underlying fundamentals, but they also have a coordination motive arising from a strategic complementarity in their actions. When the agents have no socially valuable private information, greater provision of public information always increases welfare. However, when agents also have access to independent sources of information, the welfare effect of increased public disclosures is ambiguous.