A Mechanism for the Allocation of Corporate Investment
探讨在不完全市场下企业投资具有公共品特征，指出Dreze-Samuelson条件虽能实现约束帕累托最优，但因股东偏好分歧和激励问题难以直接应用。
Corporate investment in an economy without a complete set of contingent claims markets has the characteristic of a public good in the sense that the stockholders’ consumption planscannot be separated from, but depend on, the specific investment plans of the firms. Dreze [4] has shown that a constrained Pareto optimal (CPO) allocation of investment in a stock market economy must satisfy a generalization of the Samuelson [24] condition for efficient production of public goods: the investment plan should maximize a weighted sum of the stockholders’ personal valuations of future output minus current input cost. However, except for those special cases in which CPO investment plans are unanimously supported by stockholders (see [17], [20], and [2]), the theory of the firm in incomplete markets lacks a suitable maximization criterion. Although the Dreze-Samuelson condition is a most appealing candidate, it is not unanimously preferred by stockholders, each of whom prefers that his or her own valuation of future output receives all the weight in the investment decision. Furthermore, the application of the Dreze-Samuelson condition depends on the correct revelation of stockholders’ preferences, which, in the absence of special inducements, cannot be expected from economic agents.