Do Firms Provide Wage Insurance against Shocks?
利用匈牙利匹配雇主-雇员数据，研究工资对永久性和暂时性冲击的反应，发现对永久性冲击的工资反应是暂时性冲击的两倍，且完全保险被拒绝。
Abstract Implicit contract models imply that it is Pareto optimal for risk‐neutral firms to provide insurance to risk‐averse workers against shocks. Using a matched employer–employee dataset, I evaluate wage responses to both permanent and transitory shocks in Hungary, and compare my results to similar studies on Italian, Portuguese, German, and French datasets. I find that the magnitude of the wage response differs depending on the nature of the shock. Broadly speaking, the wage response to permanent shocks is twice the size of the response to transitory shocks. Unlike previous findings, my results show that full insurance against transitory shocks is rejected.