Taxes, M‐M Propositions and Government’s Implicit Cost of Capital in Investment Projects in the Private Sector
将政府的公司税收索取权内化到企业资本结构分析中，重新推导MM命题，提出一个更能反映现代金融现实的增强版MM模型，并分析不同索取权人在投资决策中的利益冲突，为政府制定鼓励社会最优投资水平的政策提供分析框架。
The corporate tax claim of the government is internalised in the analysis of the corporation's capital structure. In this framework the M‐M Propositions are rederived. In the proposed approach, the current value of the firm is calculated on a before‐tax basis, and is equal to the sum of present values of equity, debt, and government claim. An enhanced M‐M model is derived, which is more representative of modern financial realities, and has significant implications for the practice of financial analysis. The paper highlights the potential conflict of interest among the different claimholders in making an investment decision. The model presented here allows us to analyse the tradeoffs among various policies available to the government to encourage investments to their socially optimal level.