Corporate Governance and Investors' Perceptions of Foreign IPO Value: An Institutional Perspective
研究美国投资者如何根据公司治理机制组合和母国制度环境评价外国IPO价值，发现不同治理组合可产生相同估值，且母国少数股东保护强度影响所需治理机制数量。
This article investigates stock market responses to different constellations of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms by focusing on foreign initial public offerings (IPOs) in the United States. We build on sociology-grounded research on financial market behavior and use a “nested” legitimacy framework to explore US investor perceptions of foreign IPO value. Using a fuzzy set theoretic methodology, we demonstrate how different combinations of monitoring and incentive-based corporate governance mechanisms lead to the same level of investor valuation of firms. Moreover, institutional factors related to the strength of minority shareholder protection in a foreign IPO's home country represent a boundary condition that affects the number of governance mechanisms required to achieve high value perceptions among US investors. Our findings contribute to the sociological perspective on comparative corporate governance and the dependencies between organizations and institutions.