An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
通过实验室实验，评估了FCC开发的灵活组合拍卖格式与其他组合拍卖格式的表现，发现组合时钟格式收入最高，而FCC格式表现较差，这解释了其未被实施的原因。
This paper reports laboratory experiments that evaluate the performance of a flexible package bidding format developed by the FCC, in comparison with other combinatorial formats. In general, the interest of policy makers in combinatorial auctions is justified by the laboratory data. When value complementarities are present, package bidding yields improved performance. We find clear differences among the combinatorial auction formats both in terms of efficiency and seller revenue, however. Notably, the combinatorial clock provides the highest revenue. The FCC's flexible package bidding format performed worse than the alternatives, which is one of the main reasons why it was not implemented.