The Interaction Effect of Rivalry Restraint and Competitive Advantage on Profit: Why the Whole Is Less Than the Sum of the Parts
通过理论模型预测，同时抑制竞争和增强竞争优势对利润的交互效应为负，即两者相互削弱而非增强，对理论、实践和教学有重要启示。
Rivalry-restraint-based theoretical mechanisms predict that an industry's profits will increase when its firms engage in less price competition, or less direct competition, with each other. Competitive-advantage-based theoretical mechanisms predict that a firm's profits will increase when it creates superior economic value that direct and indirect competitors cannot fully compete away. But what is the interaction effect on profit of simultaneously restraining rivalry and increasing competitive advantage? Do they positively amplify/reinforce each other, or negatively dampen/undermine each other? This paper's theoretical model predicts a negative interaction effect, with potentially significant implications for theory, practice, and pedagogy.