Mutual Assistance between Federal Reserve Banks, 1913-1960 as Prolegomena to the TARGET2 Debate
重建了1913至1960年间美国联邦储备银行间互助的历史，通过数据展示紧急情况下黄金储备的共享操作，发现互助对应对流动性危机和银行挤兑至关重要，且不平衡会随地区冲击消退而缩小，为当前欧洲TARGET2余额辩论提供历史参考。
This article reconstructs the history of mutual assistance among Federal Reserve Banks. We present data on accommodation operations through which Reserve Banks mutualized gold reserves in emergency situations between 1913 and 1960. Reserve sharing was important in response to liquidity crises and bank runs. Such cooperation was essential for the cohesion of the U.S. monetary union. But fortunes could change, with emergency recipients of gold becoming providers. Because imbalances did not endlessly grow, instead narrowing when region-specific shocks subsided, mutual assistance created only limited tensions. These findings speak to the current debate over TARGET2 balances in Europe.