Competition and the Efficiency of Markets for Technology
研究技术许可中买方竞争对许可时机的影响，发现竞争加剧可能导致许可延迟和效率损失，基于制药行业数据验证。
The sale of ideas through licensing facilitates the division of labor between the separate activities of research and development. This vertical specialization can improve the overall efficiency of the innovative process. However, these gains depend on the timing of the sale: the buyer of an innovative project should assume development at the stage at which he has an efficiency advantage. Using data from the pharmaceutical industry, we show that competition between potential buyers is related to the timing of licensing. Furthermore, the effect differs by the type of competitor. We then describe a class of models that yields predictions consistent with these empirical patterns. Our key insight is that increased competition may increase licensing delays and hence inefficiency. This paper was accepted by David Hsu, entrepreneurship and innovation.