The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters*
当价格工资制定者数量较少时，即使没有名义刚性，货币政策规则也会影响均衡就业率；非适应性政策下大工会的工资节制可提高实际货币供给和就业，而适应性政策则无此效果。
Monetary rules matter for the equilibrium rate of employment when the number of price-wage setters is small, even when assuming rational expectations, complete information, central bank precommitment, and absence of nominal rigidities. If the central bank is nonaccommodating, sufficiently large unions, bargaining independently, have an incentive to moderate sectoral money wages, and thereby expected real wages. The result is an increase in the real money supply, and hence higher demand and employment. This does not hold with accommodating monetary policy since unions' wage decisions cannot then affect the real money supply. A similar argument holds for large monopolistically competitive price setters.