Information, Selective Disclosure, and Analyst Behavior
研究公平披露规则（Reg FD）禁止向股票分析师选择性披露后，是否改变了信息披露的数量和方式。发现规则实施后分析师更依赖公司主动披露的信息，且管理层可能用盈利指引替代选择性披露。
This paper examines whether the prohibition of selective disclosures to equity research analysts mandated by Regulation FD alters the amount of information and the manner in which it is revealed to the market. We demonstrate that equity research analysts are more responsive to information contained in company‐initiated disclosures after Reg FD, suggesting that regulation has affected the importance of various channels of communication. We also present evidence consistent with the notion that managers use earnings guidance as a substitute for selective disclosure following the passage of Reg FD.