How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
研究了在信贷和保险市场不完善、家庭内部转移和儿童课外时间使用为私人信息的情况下，如何通过强制入学、控制显性童工、结合需求与成绩的补助金及专项税，来优化教育政策并应对隐蔽童工问题。
Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need-and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.child labor, education,