董事会中的政治家:关系会影响企业绩效吗?

Politicians on the Board of Directors: Do Connections Affect the Bottom Line?

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT · 2005
被引 912 · 同刊同年前 8%
人大 AFT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究发现,在监管严格的行业中,企业更可能任命前政治家为董事,且这类董事与更好的市场绩效相关,尤其在监管严格的行业中关系更显著。

Abstract

Resource dependence theory emphasizes the importance of linking firms with external contingencies that create uncertainty and interdependence. A critical source of external interdependency and uncertainty for business is government. One way to link a firm to the government is appointing ex-politicians to the board of directors. This study compares the boards of two groups of firms—those from heavily and less regulated industries—and finds the former group has more politician directors. Firms with politicians on the board are associated with better market-based performance across both groups, although the relationship is more pronounced within heavily regulated industries.

公司治理董事会政治关联资源依赖理论企业绩效