EXCLUSIVE QUALITY*
研究了在垂直差异化产品市场中，上游在位企业如何通过排他性合同阻止高质量竞争对手进入，即使零售层面存在伯特兰竞争。
In the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a high‐quality rival. Indeed, because of differentiation, the incumbent's inferior product is not eliminated upon entry. Due to the resulting competitive pressure, a retailer who considers rejecting the exclusivity contract expects to earn much less than the incumbent's monopoly rents. Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent can always offer high enough an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign the contract and achieve exclusion. This is true under linear pricing for intermediate levels of entry costs, and with two‐part tariffs even in the absence of entry costs.