When Do Export Subsidies Have a Redistributional Role?
研究出口补贴在何种条件下能有效转移经济剩余，发现只有在大出口均衡下补贴才与农业收入目标存在函数关系，且结果不受国内税收扭曲影响。
Abstract If an export subsidy is efficient, that is, has a surplus‐transfer role, then there exists an implicit function relating the optimal level of the subsidy to the income target in the agricultural sector. If an export subsidy is inefficient no such function exists. We show that dependence exists in large‐export equilibrium, not in small‐export equilibrium and show that these results remain robust to concerns about domestic tax distortions. The failure of previous work to produce this result stems from its neglect of the income constraint on producer surplus in the programming problem transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers.