Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay
分析经理人创造投资机会与提供准确信息两项任务间的互动，揭示其如何内生地导致过度投资，并探讨内部资本市场竞争如何加剧这一偏差，为理解企业边界提供新视角。
We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions.