Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games
研究竞争性协调博弈中组内沟通的不对称性和内生性，发现不对称沟通虽不如对称沟通有害，但仍加剧竞争并降低效率，且群体倾向于内生建立沟通渠道，即使这会降低整体收益。
Abstract Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (1) asymmetric communication and (2) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding the effect of communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case when neither group can communicate. Moreover, groups vote to endogenously establish communication channels even though they would earn higher payoffs if jointly they chose to restrict within-group communication.