A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs*
提出一个福利准则，用于评估代理人信念存在异质性扭曲的经济体中的资源配置效率，该准则不预设谁的信念正确，而是通过检验配置是否在所有代理人信念的凸组合下都有效来判定。
Abstract This article proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. Instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct, our criterion asserts that an allocation is belief-neutral efficient (inefficient) if it is efficient (inefficient) under any convex combination of agents’ beliefs. Although this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations, it can identify positive- and negative-sum speculation driven by conflicting beliefs in a broad range of economic environments.