Model Uncertainty and Delegation: A Case for Friedman's k‐Percent Money Growth Rule?
研究模型不确定性如何影响货币政策委托问题，发现当存在模型不确定性时，委托央行执行弗里德曼的固定货币增长率规则优于灵活通胀目标制，因为后者为稳健性付出的代价超过了货币增长目标的低效率。
Model uncertainty affects the monetary policy delegation problem. If there is uncertainty with regards to the determination of the delegated objective variables, the central bank will want robustness against potential model misspecifications. We show that with plausible degree of model uncertainty, delegation of the Friedman rule of increasing the money stock by k percent to the central bank will outperform commitment to the social loss function (flexible inflation targeting). The reason is that the price paid for robustness under flexible inflation targeting outweighs the inefficiency of money growth targeting. Imperfect control of money growth does not change this conclusion.