Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty
分析一个顺序博弈模型，研究两个对立游说团体如何通过竞购议员选票影响立法投票，重点计算先动游说者赢得博弈所需的最小预算及其在议员间的分配。
In this article, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model there is a strong second-mover advantage, so the lobbyist moving first will make offers to legislators only if he deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e. if he anticipates winning the battle. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest budget that he needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of game's key parameters on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.