Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists
分析创业者和顾问共同投入努力以提高项目生产率的最优合约，发现当创业者努力更高效时，不提供资金的顾问不会被雇佣，外部融资内生出现，并解释为何风险投资家能提升企业价值。
Abstract This paper analyses the joint provision of effort by an entrepreneur and by an advisor to improve the productivity of an investment project. Without moral hazard, it is optimal that both exert effort. With moral hazard, if the entrepreneur's effort is more efficient (less costly) than the advisor's effort, the latter is not hired if she does not provide funds. Outside financing arises endogenously. This explains why investors like venture capitalists are value enhancing. The level of outside financing determines whether common stocks or convertible bonds should be issued in response to incentives.