Efficient Redistribution Using Quotas and Subsidies in the Presence of Misrepresentation and Cheating
分析虚报和作弊如何影响产出配额与补贴的收入再分配效率，发现作弊使配额效率降低、补贴效率提高，通常补贴优于配额，但两者组合仍最有效。
Abstract This paper introduces misrepresentation and cheating into the policy analysis of output quotas and subsidies. Analytical results show that when cheating occurs output quotas are a less efficient means of income redistribution than is traditionally believed. As well, cheating increases the transfer efficiency of output subsidies. The result is that an all‐or‐nothing choice between quotas and subsidies will generally favor the use of subsidies. A combination of quotas and subsidies, however, usually remains the most efficient means of income redistribution through market intervention.