The Effect of Providing Peer Information on Retirement Savings Decisions
通过401(k)计划的实地实验，发现向低储蓄员工提供同伴参与率或贡献率信息反而降低了他们的储蓄意愿，尤其是对不符合自动加入条件的非参与者，向上社会比较带来的挫败感是主因。
ABSTRACT Using a field experiment in a 401(k) plan, we measure the effect of disseminating information about peer behavior on savings. Low‐saving employees received simplified plan enrollment or contribution increase forms. A randomized subset of forms stated the fraction of age‐matched coworkers participating in the plan or age‐matched participants contributing at least 6% of pay to the plan. We document an oppositional reaction: the presence of peer information decreased the savings of nonparticipants who were ineligible for 401(k) automatic enrollment, and higher observed peer savings rates also decreased savings. Discouragement from upward social comparisons seems to drive this reaction.