Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining With Outside Options
研究了不完全信息和外部选项如何影响长期玩家与一系列短期玩家重复谈判中的谈判姿态和剩余分配，发现外部选项不仅作为分歧点，还揭示了长期玩家的私人信息，导致均衡中短期玩家的出价不总是随声誉变化，长期玩家可能通过低效随机外部选项建立声誉以获取更大收益，但也面临失去声誉的风险。
We study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players. The outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long-run player. In equilibrium, the uninformed short-run players' offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long-run player's payoffs are discontinuous. The long-run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly in order to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short-run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff, but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power. We investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside option diffuses. In both cases, bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior.