RECENT ADVANCES IN OLIGOPOLY THEORY FROM A GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE
综述了博弈论新进展如何帮助理解寡头理论，指出传统模型因静态性而存在多重解的问题，重复博弈分析表明结果可能更合作，并探讨了不完全信息对惩罚作弊的限制及战略投资的作用。
Abstract. This paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory. It is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected, and this is related to the static nature of the models employed. One important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games, and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests. Related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes, and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments. One way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments, for example in production capacity, and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment.