ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC PROJECTS: EFFICIENCY AND DECENTRALIZATION*
在极一般假设下（无限私人商品、无结构公共项目集、非序偏好）讨论福利经济学两大基本定理，证明效率与分散化的近似与精确结果，适合研究公共项目与福利理论的学者。
The article deals with the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for production economies with a finite set of agents, infinitely many private goods, and a set of public projects. The problem of efficiency and decentralization is addressed under the following very general assumptions: (a) the commodity–price duality is endowed with a consistent locally convex topology; (b) the set of public projects is without any mathematical structure. Moreover, any agent is characterized by a nonordered preference relation depending on consumption goods and public projects. Approximate and exact welfare theorems are discussed throughout the article.