On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets*
研究银行与金融市场共存时，因项目质量不可观察和投资决策不可签约，标准银行缓解道德风险、投资银行缓解逆向选择，但竞争迫使银行提高还款额，导致偷懒者增多，共存可能社会无效率。
Abstract We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets by studying a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible. Standard banks can alleviate moral‐hazard problems, while financial markets operated by investment banks can alleviate adverse‐selection problems. In competition, standard banks are forced to increase repayments, since financial markets can attract the highest‐quality borrowers. This, in turn, increases the share of shirkers and may make lending unprofitable for standard banks. The coexistence of financial markets and standard banks is socially inefficient. The same inefficiency may occur with the entrance of sophisticated banks, operating with a combination of rating and ongoing monitoring technologies.