Deposit Insurance and Lender-of-Last-Resort Functions
探讨同时存在存款保险和最后贷款人时银行安全网的设计问题，指出贴现窗口的准入和定价比存款保险定价更重要，并分析最后贷款人应否自由放贷但收取高利率。
We consider issues concerning the design of a banking system safety net when both a deposit insurer and a lender of last resort are present. In our model both entities have a role to play. Moreover, issues related to deposit insurance pricing are relatively unimportant in this context, whereas issues related to discount window access and pricing are not. We discuss when and why (or why not) a lender of last resort should lend liberally but charge high rates of interest. And, we raise the possibility that discount window policy may enhance or reduce the scope for multiplicity of equilibria.