Contracts and Technology Adoption
构建了一个分析合同不完全性、技术互补性与技术采纳之间关系的框架，发现合同不完全性会导致企业采用较不先进的技术，且这种效应在中间投入互补性更强时更为显著，可用于解释不同国家因合同制度差异而产生的生产率与比较优势差异。
We develop a tractable framework for the analysis of the relationship between contractual incompleteness, technological complementarities, and technology adoption. In our model, a firm chooses its technology and investment levels in contractible activities by suppliers of intermediate inputs. Suppliers then choose investments in noncontractible activities, anticipating payoffs from an ex post bargaining game. We show that greater contractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of less advanced technologies, and that the impact of contractual incompleteness is more pronounced when there is greater complementary among the intermediate inputs. We study a number of applications of the main framework and show that the mechanism proposed in the paper can generate sizable productivity differences across countries with different contracting institutions, and that differences in contracting institutions lead to endogenous comparative advantage differences.