共同基金咨询合同为何变更?业绩、增长与溢出效应

Why Do Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts Change? Performance, Growth, and Spillover Effects

Journal of Finance · 2011
被引 74
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了股票型共同基金投资咨询合同费率的变化,发现费率上调与优异业绩相关,下调与规模经济相关,且基金家族内部存在溢出效应。

Abstract

ABSTRACT We examine changes in equity mutual funds' investment advisory contracts. We find substantial advisory compensation rate changes in both directions, with typical percentage fee shifts exceeding one‐fourth. Rate increases are associated with superior past market‐adjusted performance, whereas rate decreases reflect economies of scale associated with growth, and are not associated with extreme poor performance. There are within‐family spillover effects. Superior (e.g., star) performance for individual funds is associated with rate increases for a family's other funds. Rate reductions post‐2004 by family funds involved in market timing scandals do not have large industry spillover effects.

共同基金咨询合同费率变化溢出效应