Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives
研究在员工存在不平等厌恶偏好时，雇主如何通过设计团队或相对绩效合同来利用员工的嫉妒或内疚感，从而在努力可契约化的情况下仍能获利。
Abstract We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity, as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . A “selfish” employer can profitably exploit envy or guilt by offering contracts which create inequity off‐equilibrium, i.e., when employees do not meet his demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts. We derive conditions for inequity aversion to be in itself a reason to form work teams of distributionally concerned employees, even in situations in which effort is contractible.