Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice
通过实验研究代际最小努力博弈中，建议作为协调工具的作用，发现公开且成为共同知识的建议最有助于实现帕累托最优结果。
We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the ‘Minimum Effort Game’ which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff-dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge.