Reputation and Persistence of Adverse Selection in Secondary Loan Markets
研究了二级贷款市场发行量随抵押品价值波动的原因，发现声誉机制导致逆向选择持续存在，并分析了效率条件与政策干预。
The volume of new issuances in secondary loan markets fluctuates over time and falls when collateral values fall. We develop a model with adverse selection and reputation that is consistent with such fluctuations. Adverse selection ensures that the volume of trade falls when collateral values fall. Without reputation, the equilibrium has separation, adverse selection is quickly resolved, and trade volume is independent of collateral value. With reputation, the equilibrium has pooling and adverse selection persists over time. The equilibrium is efficient unless collateral values are low and originators' reputational levels are low. We describe policies that can implement efficient outcomes.