Investment, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Ownership
研究发现，当公司特质风险上升时，企业投资会下降，且高管持股比例越高，下降越明显；但期权薪酬或机构投资者持股能缓解这一负面效应。
ABSTRACT High‐powered incentives may induce higher managerial effort, but they also expose managers to idiosyncratic risk. If managers are risk averse, they might underinvest when firm‐specific uncertainty increases, leading to suboptimal investment decisions from the perspective of well‐diversified shareholders. We empirically document that, when idiosyncratic risk rises, firm investment falls, and more so when managers own a larger fraction of the firm. This negative effect of managerial risk aversion on investment is mitigated if executives are compensated with options rather than with shares or if institutional investors form a large part of the shareholder base.