The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture
用委托代理模型分析利益集团如何影响监管机构，发现组织会降低利益集团的监管利益，生产者保护导致低激励方案，消费者政治可能促使多产品企业统一定价，利益集团在低效监管中权力更大。
The paper develops an agency-theoretic approach to interest-group politics and shows the following: (1) the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation. (2) The threat of producer protection leads to low-powered incentive schemes for regulated firms. (3) Consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm. (4) An interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation, where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal (Congress).