Dynamic Inefficiencies in an Employment-Based Health Insurance System: Theory and Evidence
研究美国就业型健康保险制度如何导致个人在职业生涯中对健康投资不足，从而增加退休后的医疗支出，并利用MEPS和HRS数据提供了实证证据。
We investigate the effects of the institutional settings of the US health care system on individuals' life-cycle medical expenditures. Health is a form of general human capital; labor turnover and labor-market frictions prevent an employer-employee pair from capturing the entire surplus from investment in an employee's health. Thus, the pair underinvests in health during working years, thereby increasing medical expenditures during retirement. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the comparative statics predictions of our model using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Our estimates suggest significant inefficiencies in health investment in the United States.