The Supply of Information by a Concerned Expert
研究政策制定者应向信息不足的公民传递多少信息，发现标准显示偏好理论无法回答此问题，转而使用心理预期效用和心理博弈模型求解。
How much information should a policy maker pass on to an ill‐informed citizen? In this paper, we address this classic question of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in a setting in which beliefs impact utility, as in Kreps and Porteus (1978). We show that this question cannot be answered using a utility function with standard revealed preference foundations. To solve the model, we go beyond the classical model in two respects, relying on the psychological expected utility model of Caplin and Leahy (2001) to capture preferences, and the psychological game model of Geanakoplos et al. (1989) to capture strategic interactions.