转售价格维持的演变中的法律与经济学

The Evolving Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance

Journal of Law & Economics · 2014
被引 7
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

基于《反垄断悖论》以来的经济进展,论证转售价格维持是制造商补偿零售商促销服务的有效方式,即使不存在搭便车问题,零售商也可能主动要求转售价格维持以获得竞争性价格。

Abstract

Economic developments since the publication of The Antitrust Paradox have reinforced Bork’s view that resale price maintenance is part of the competitive market process by which firms create efficient distribution arrangements. Even when there is no retailer free riding, manufacturers cannot rely entirely on retailer competition to supply desired point-of-sale retailing services because retailer promotion has little or no inter-retailer demand effects. Consequently, manufacturers must compensate retailers for devoting their valuable retail assets to the sale of a manufacturer’s products, and resale price maintenance often is an efficient way to accomplish this. Therefore, contrary to Bork, retailers may initiate demands for resale price maintenance to obtain a competitive market price for their promotional services.

转售价格维持反垄断法竞争效应分销效率