Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation
研究发现美国职业棒球大联盟裁判在评估投手时存在种族/民族偏好，当裁判与投手种族不匹配时，好球判罚减少，尤其在监督薄弱时；投手会调整投球策略应对偏见，这些直接和间接效应导致少数族裔绩效指标被低估，对衡量工资歧视有启示。
Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination.