EMPLOYMENT, DETERRENCE, AND CRIME IN A DYNAMIC MODEL*
利用月度面板数据和最大似然估计，构建并估计了一个动态犯罪决策模型，发现被捕后未来劳动力市场的负面预期对犯罪有强大威慑作用，且这种前瞻性行为显著影响政策效果。
Using maximum likelihood techniques and monthly panel data we solve and estimate an explicitly dynamic model of criminal behavior where current criminal activity impacts future labor market outcomes. We show that the threat of future adverse effects in the labor market when arrested acts as a strong deterrent to crime. Moreover, such forward‐looking behavior is estimated to be important. Hence, policies that weaken this deterrence will be much less effective in fighting crime. This suggests that prevention is more powerful than redemption since anticipated redemption allows criminals to look forward to negating the consequences of their crimes.