INEFFICIENT LOCK‐IN AND SUBSIDY COMPETITION*
研究两个不对称地区在新型贸易模型中的补贴竞争，发现当产业核心被低效锁定在较小地区时，补贴竞争可促使产业迁至较大地区恢复效率，但若工人福利权重更高，小地区可能通过高补贴阻止产业转移。
This article studies a subsidy game among two asymmetric regions in a new trade model. Capital can freely move among regions, but capital rewards are repatriated to the region of residence. The activity of the modern sector is associated with positive spillovers. We study subsidy competition, starting from an equilibrium where the industry core is inefficiently locked in to the smaller region. When regions weigh workers’ and capitalists’ welfare equally, subsidy competition results in a relocation of industry to the larger region, restoring an efficient allocation. When workers’ welfare is weighted more heavily, the smaller (core) region may pay subsidies that are high enough to prevent a relocation of industry.