The Effects of Founder and Family Ownership on Hired CEOs’ Incentives and Firm Performance
研究发现，家族所有者比创始人所有者更倾向于为雇佣CEO提供高激励薪酬，以吸引非家族CEO并提升公司绩效，而创始人所有者因无社会情感财富干扰，过度使用激励反而适得其反。
Although large owners monitor managers effectively, they differ in important ways. Whereas founder owners focus on firm performance, family owners also pursue socioemotional goals. We leverage this distinction to theorize that family owners offer hired CEOs more incentive pay—to attract nonfamily CEOs, signal good governance, and achieve better firm performance. Without socioemotional wealth distractions, founder owners do not need high incentives and overusing them is counterproductive. Bayesian regressions using a panel of 335 S&P 500 firms support our theory. A key implication is that founder and family owners approach governance differently and these differences affect firm performance.